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Daniele Bertolini*

Contracting Out Liability for Negligent
Pre-Contractual Misrepresentation

This article examines the extent to which entire agreement clauses (EACs) and
non-reliance clauses (NRCs) are enforceable to preclude actions for negligent
pre-contractual misrepresentations. It is argued that courts could improve legal
certainty and contractual fairness by adopting two distinct legal rules to be applied,
respectively, to contracts between sophisticated parties and in adhesion contracts.
First, it is suggested that in contracts between sophisticated parties only specific
contractual barriers to actions should provide a complete defence against negligent
misrepresentation claims. Under this rule, the exclusionary effect of EACs and
NRCs would be achieved only if an express term of the contract is inconsistent with
the pre-contractual statement on which the plaintiff bases their tort claim. Second,
it is proposed that in contracts of adhesion EACs and NRCs should be regarded as
presumptively unconscionable, thereby precluding sophisticated parties from using
such clauses as a shield against tort claims for negligence misrepresentations.
Dans cet article, nous examinons dans quelle mesure les clauses d’accord
global (CAG) et les clauses de non-recours (CNR) sont exécutoires pour
exclure les actions pour fausses déclarations précontractuelles négligentes.
Nous soutenons que les tribunaux pourraient améliorer la certitude juridique et
l’équité contractuelle en adoptant deux règles juridiques distinctes à appliquer,
respectivement, aux contrats entre parties averties et aux contrats d’adhésion.
Premièrement, il est suggéré que dans les contrats entre parties averties, seules
des barrières contractuelles spécifiques aux actions devraient fournir une défense
complète contre les réclamations pour fausse déclaration négligente. En vertu de
cette règle, l’effet d’exclusion des CAG et des CNR ne serait obtenu que si une
clause expresse du contrat est incompatible avec la déclaration précontractuelle
sur laquelle le demandeur fonde son action en réparation. Deuxièmement, il est
proposé que, dans les contrats d’adhésion, les CAG et les CNR soient considérées
comme présumées inadmissibles, empêchant ainsi les parties averties d’utiliser
de telles clauses comme rempart contre les actions en réparation pour fausses
déclarations négligentes.
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Introduction
This article concerns the extent to which contract barriers to actions
for negligent pre-contractual misrepresentations are enforceable under
the Canadian common law of contract. Despite their widespread use in
commercial contracts between legally sophisticated parties and boilerplate
clauses in adhesion contracts, the legal significance of such clauses is far
from definitive, and their effectiveness in shielding contracting parties
against claims in tort for negligent misrepresentations is subject to several
limitations. On several occasions, Canadian courts have given effect to
contract barriers to tort actions and prevented pre-contractual statements
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from being legally operative;1 in other instances, they have disregarded
these barriers and recognized the validity of tort claims based on statements
external to the contract.2 These competing approaches have created
uncertainty over the extent to which parties to a commercial agreement
may effectively exclude tort claims for negligent misrepresentation based
on statements made during contractual negotiations.
Contracting parties may draft two broad types of contract clauses
to preclude actions for negligent pre-contractual misrepresentations.
The first is the entire agreement clause (EAC) proper or the integration
clause, which is usually phrased along the following lines: “This writing
constitutes the final and entire agreement between the parties with respect
to all the matters therein referred to and there are no other agreements,
understandings, promises, representations, warranties, or conditions of
any kind, oral or written, expressed or implied, which are not merged
into this contract and superseded by it.” By stating that the contracts’ full
terms may be found in the written document containing the clause, parties
aim to identify the exclusive source of contractual obligations, thereby
excluding any liability for claims arising from statements external to the
written contract.
The second type is the non-reliance clause (NRC), or the disclaimer
clause, which is usually phrased along the following lines: “No reliance
is placed by any party on any warranty, representation, opinion, advice
or assertion of fact made by any party, its directors, officers, employees
or agents, to any other party, its directors, officers, employees or agents,
except to the extent that it has been reduced to writing and included in this
agreement.” By stating that the parties have not relied on any representations
other than those set out in the contract, the NRC specifically aims to
prevent parties from successfully establishing the constituent elements of
negligent misrepresentation, such as reasonable reliance on pre-contractual
statements or duty of care. Although the distinction between EACs and
NRCs is articulated in the relevant case law,3 contracts often contain
elements of integration clauses and disclaimer clauses within the same
1.
E.g., Bow Valley Husky Bermuda Ltd v Saint John Shipping Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 1210 [Bow
Valley]; No 2002 Taurus Ventures Ltd v Intrawest Corp, [2007] BCJ No. 812 [Taurus BCCA]; Houle
v Knelsen Sand and Gravel Ltd, 2016 ABCA 247 [Knelsen ABCA], leave to appeal refused Knelsen
Sand and Gravel Ltd v Houle, 2017 CarswellAlta 381, 2017 CarswellAlta 382.
2.
E.g., Betker v Williams (1992), 63 BCLR (2d) 14 (BCCA); Zippy Print Enterprises Ltd. v
Pawliuk, [1994] BCJ No. 2778 [Zippy]; Feldstein v 364 Northern Development Corp, 2017 BCCA
174 [Feldstein BCCA].
3.
E.g., Carman Construction Ltd v Canadian Pacific Railway Co, [1982] 1 SCR 958 [Carman];
BG Checo International Ltd v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1993] 1 SCR 12 [BG
Checo].
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broadly worded EAC. Consequently, several decisions by lower courts
use the term EAC loosely to denote clauses comprising both an integration
clause and a disclaimer clause. Throughout the discussion, I refer to both
types of contract barrier to tort action for negligent misrepresentation as
EACs proper and NRCs.
Contract scholars in the common law tradition have long debated the
implications of EACs and NRCs on tort claims.4 In the specific context
of the Canadian common law of contract, academic commentaries have
examined the impact of EACs on negligence misrepresentation claims
mostly in conjunction with the impact on claims in contract.5 Commentators
have often emphasized the lack of a coherent, unified rationale underlying
the operation of EACs and the resulting legal uncertainty.6 However, it is
worth emphasizing that the impact of an EAC on contractual adjudication is
distinct and largely independent of its impact on tort claims. Therefore, the
two aspects warrant separate analyses. In this article, I focus solely on the
impact of EACs and NRCs on tort claims for negligence misrepresentation
and refrain from discussing the effects of such clauses on tort claims for
fraudulent misrepresentation or claims in contract.7 Specifically, I examine
4.
Elizabeth Cumming, “Balancing the Buyer’s Right to Recover for Pre-contractual Misstatements
and the Seller’s Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties” (1992) 76:5 Minn L Rev 1189; Jared M
Levin, “A Proposed Penalty Default Rule Governing a Seller’s Ability to Disclaim Liability for Precontractual Misrepresentations” (1997) 2 Colum Bus L Rev 399; Kevin Davis, “Licensing Lies:
Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-contractual Misrepresentations” (1999) 33:2 Val U
L Rev 485; Catherine Mitchell, “Entire agreement clauses: Contracting out of contextualism” (2006)
22 JCL 222 at 225; Glenn D West & W Benton Lewis Jr, “Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual
Liability—Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?” (2009) 64:4 The Business
Lawyer 999; Kabir Masson, “Paradox of Presumptions: Seller Warranties and Reliance Waivers in
Commercial Contracts” (2009) 109:3 Colum L Rev 503; Russell Korobkin, “The Borat Problem in
Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts”
(2013) 101 Cal L Rev 51; Jonathan Morgan, “Opting for ‘Documentary Fundamentalism’: Respecting
Party Choice for Entire Agreement and Non-Reliance Clauses,” in Paul S Davies & Magda Raczynska,
eds, Contents of Commercial Contracts: Terms Affecting Freedoms (London: Bloomsbury Publishing
Plc, 2020) at 239–266.
5.
Francis Dawson, “Parol Evidence, Misrepresentation and Collateral Contracts” (1982) 27:3
McGill LJ 403; Perell, “A Riddle Inside an Enigma: The Entire Agreement Clause” (1998) The
Advocates’ Q. 287; MH Ogilvie, “Entire Agreement Clauses: Neither Riddle nor Enigma,” (2008)
87 Can. B. Rev. 626 at 645; Geoff R Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law (Toronto: Lexis
Nexis, 2016) at 318; Angela Swan, Jakub Adamski & Annie Na, Canadian Contract Law, 4th ed
(Markham: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2018) at 752; John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 3d ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2020) at 790.
6.
Perell, ibid; Hall, ibid; Cynthia L Elderkin & Julia Shin Doi, Behind and Beyond Boilerplate:
Drafting Commercial Agreements, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 2018) at 45. See,
however, Ogilvie, supra note 5.
7.
EACs impacts on contractual adjudication by interplaying with the doctrines of contractual
interpretation, collateral contract and implication of terms. For comments on the relationship between
EACs and contractual adjudication, see Perell, supra note 5; Ogilvie, ibid; Hall, supra note 5; Swan,
Adamski & Na, supra note 5 at 752; McCamus, supra note 5 at 790; Morgan, supra note 4 at 239–266;
Bertolini, “Unpacking entire agreement clauses: On the (elusive) search for contractually induced

Contracting Out Liability for Negligent Pre-Contractual
Misrepresentation

383

the interplay between these EACs and NRCs on the principle of concurrent
actionability of actions in tort and contract, the legal regime of exculpatory
clauses and the doctrine of unconscionability.
In assessing the enforceability of EACs and NRCs, courts must
strike a balance between the buyer’s right to recover for pre-contractual
misstatements and the seller’s ability to negotiate contractual barriers to
misrepresentation actions. This paper argues that the appropriate balance
between these competing goals varies depending on whether such clauses
are found in fully negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties or
in adhesion contracts. In fully negotiated contracts, the parties’ relatively
more balanced bargaining power and greater homogeneity in the parties’
legal sophistication emphasize the need for promoting the parties’
common goals and intentions. By contrast, in standardized form contracts,
the contractual relationship is systematically skewed to the disadvantage
of one party: unsophisticated purchasers are particularly vulnerable to
exploitation by terms that serve only the sophisticated seller’s interests. In
this context, the main objective of contractual adjudication is to protect the
vulnerable party who cannot meaningfully participate in contract design.
Contracts of adhesion entail a shift in the normative focus of contract
law from the enforcement of the common purpose of the parties to the
protection of the party at a disadvantage.
That EAC and NRC legal regimes should reflect the changing
normative needs underlying different contractual settings is partially
reflected in current Canadian case law. As discussed in this paper, in
assessing the enforceability of EACs and NRCs, Canadian courts consider
the characteristics of the transactional setting within which these clauses
operate, including the inequality of bargaining power between parties,
their level of legal sophistication, and whether the contract containing
such clauses is fully negotiated or a contract of adhesion. Moreover,
commentators have highlighted—albeit not with specific respect to the
enforcement of EACs and NRCs—the distinctive nature of the issues
involved in standard form agreements compared to specifically negotiated
contracts.8 However, both scholarly and jurisprudential debates have
seldom inquired into whether courts could incrementally improve the
formalism in contractual adjudication” (2021) 66 MGill L J (forthcoming).
8.
Peter Benson “Radin on Consent and Fairness in Consumer Boilerplate: A Brief Comment” (2013)
54 Can. Bus. LJ 282; Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the
Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Jason MacLean, “The Death of Contract,
Redux: Boilerplate and the End of Interpretation” (2016) 58:3 Can Bus LJ 289; John Enman-Beech,
“When Is a Contract Not a Contract?: Douez v Facebook Inc. and Boilerplate” (2017) 60:3 Can Bus
LJ 428.
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current case law of EACs and NRCs in terms of greater legal certainty,
efficiency, and fairness.
This article’s central thesis is that courts may improve legal certainty and
contractual fairness by more markedly differentiating the legal treatment
of EACs and NRCs in fully negotiated contracts between sophisticated
parties and in adhesion contracts. More specifically, it is suggested that
courts adopt two distinct legal rules. First, it is suggested that in contracts
between sophisticated parties only specific contractual barriers to actions
should provide a complete defence against negligent misrepresentation
claims. Under this rule, the exclusionary effect of contractual barriers
to tort actions would be achieved only if an express term of the contract
contradicts or is inconsistent with the pre-contractual statement on which
the plaintiff bases their tort claim. The adoption of this rule would have
two legal implications. On the one hand, in force of the proposed legal
change, generically worded EACs would not be given effect to preclude
claims in tort for negligent misrepresentation that are grounded on specific
statements external to the contract. This would improve legal certainty,
since current case law fails to provide clear indications over the degree
of specificity required for the enforceability of EACs and NRCs. On the
other hand, the proposed rule would add a restrictive qualification to the
principle—long-established in Canadian case law—that pre-contractual
negligent misrepresentations are actionable as both a breach of contract
and negligent misrepresentation.9 The proposed legal change would
generalize the application of the rule identified in Iacobucci’s dissenting
opinion in BG Checo,10 which states that when the express terms of a
contract provides a contractual obligation that is coextensive with the
common law duty of care the plaintiff cannot bring a concurrent action in
tort for negligent misrepresentation and is confined to whatever remedies
are available under the law of contract.
Second, it is argued that in contracts of adhesion courts could improve
legal certainty and contractual fairness by regarding EACs and NRCs as
presumptively unconscionable and therefore not enforceable by courts to
preclude tort claims for negligent misrepresentation. This presumption
would preclude sophisticated parties from using EACs and NRCs as a shield
against tort claims for negligence misrepresentations, thereby incentivising
them to enhance the clarity of pre-contractual communications. This
rule would improve the protection of unsophisticated representees.
Canadian case law tends to treat EACs and NRCs in adhesion contracts as
9.
10.

Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 SCR 87 [Cognos]; BG Checo, supra note 3.
BG Checo, supra note 3.
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exclusionary clauses and assesses their enforceability based on a Tercon
unconscionability analysis.11 The proposed presumptive unconscionability
would release the unsophisticated, inexperienced representee from the
burden of persuading the court that the elements of a Tercon analysis have
been met, allowing them to bring action against the careless representor
in tort.
The proposed differentiation in the legal treatment of EACs and
NRCs is consistent with the recent emerging trend in the Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) case law. The decisions in Ledcor Construction Ltd v
Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co,12 Douez v Facebook, Inc,13 and Uber
Technologies Inc v Heller14 were based on the recognition that specifically
negotiated contracts and standard-form agreements raise different issues
with respect to interpretation and application, such that it is insufficient to
have only one set of legal principles that is uniformly applied to both types
of contracts.
The discussion is organized as follows. Section I examines the issue
of concurrence of tort and contract actions and identifies the factors
considered by courts in determining the enforceability of EACs as a
barrier to tort actions for negligent misrepresentations. Section II discusses
the two strategies most commonly employed by litigants to defeat the
enforceability of EACs: narrow construction and unconscionability.
Finally, Section III investigates the normative dimension underlying the
enforceability of contract barriers to tort actions and attempts to identify
incremental improvements in the legal regime concerning such clauses.
I.

Enforcing EACs and NRCs

1. Concurrence of tort and contract
Actions in tort for negligent misrepresentations committed through precontractual statements raise the preliminary issue of whether a plaintiff who
is in a contractual relationship with the defendant can sue the defendant in
tort, when the duty relied upon by the plaintiff in tort is also an expressly
defined contractual duty. This issue is of preliminary importance to our
discussion, as any limitation to the concurrent actionability of tort and
contract actions may have the effect of precluding a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, regardless of the existence of any contractually defined
limitations to tort actions. If concurrent actionability is limited or excluded,
11. Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4
[Tercon].
12. 2016 SCC 37 [Ledcor].
13. 2017 SCC 33 [Facebook].
14. 2020 SCC 16 [Uber].
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a tort claim may be precluded independent of the existence in the contract
of an EAC or an NRC.
In Central Trust Co v Rafuse, the SCC recognized the general rule of
concurrency between claims in contract and in tort.15 Le Dain J., writing
for a unanimous Court, adopted the position that both the duty of care
and liability may be concurrent in contract and tort. It falls to the plaintiff
to select the most advantageous cause of action. Subsequently, the SCC
addressed the issue of concurrency of tort and contract in the specific
context of negligent misrepresentation in Queen v Cognos Inc16 and BG
Checo International Ltd. v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority.17
In both Cognos and BG Checo, the SCC established that an action in tort
for negligent misrepresentations is not precluded by the facts that the
alleged misrepresentations are made in a pre-contractual setting and that a
contract is subsequently entered into by the representee and representor. It
is thus a well-established, general principle in Canadian case law that precontractual misrepresentations are actionable as both a breach of contract
and negligent misrepresentation. Put otherwise, an action in tort is not
precluded by the mere existence of a contractual relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant.
One issue that tends to arise is whether specific contract terms can
nonetheless limit or exclude liability for negligent misrepresentation. In
BG Checo, the SCC established that parties may contractually allocate
their rights and duties in a way that differs from how it would be done in
accordance with tort law.18 La Forest and McLachlin JJ., writing for the
majority, identified three different ways in which contractual duties may
relate to tort duties. First, the contract may stipulate a higher duty than that
imposed by the law of tort.19 Under this scenario, which typifies the vast
majority of commercial transactions, parties are unlikely to sue in tort,
since they cannot recover through a tort action the higher contractual duty.
Second, the contract may stipulate a lower duty than that which would
be established by the law of tort in similar circumstances. The majority
of EACs and NRCs fall within the second class of cases, as parties seek
to limit their exposure to tort liability by contractually defining a duty or
liability that is lower than that which would be established by the law of
tort. Third, the duty in contract and in tort may be co-extensive when the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at para 51 [Trust].
Supra note 9.
Supra note 3.
BG Checo, ibid at para 15.
BG Checo, ibid at para 17.
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contract expressly provides for a duty that is the same as that imposed by
the common law.
The SCC ruled that in all these scenarios, the plaintiff is permitted
to sue concurrently in tort and in contract. The majority concluded that
the plaintiff was entitled to claim against the defendant in tort. In his
dissenting opinion Iacobucci J. adopted the position that where a duty
arising in tort is co-extensive with a duty created by an express term of the
contract, the plaintiff should be limited to whatever remedies are available
under the contract.20 He therefore articulated a bifurcated rule of law: if
the pre-contractual representation relied on by the plaintiff becomes an
express term of the subsequent contract, the plaintiff is precluded from
suing in tort and is limited to the remedies available in contract; if the
pre-contractual representation is not incorporated in an express term of the
contract, the plaintiff will be able to use whatever remedies are available
in the law of tort. Since, in the case at bar, the common law duty of care
was co-extensive with a duty imposed by an express contract term, he
concluded that the plaintiff was barred from exercising a concurrent action
in tort.21
Iacobucci’s line of reasoning provides a useful reference point
when discussing possible incremental improvements in the current legal
treatment of EACs and NRCs. Under the bifurcated rule identified by
Iacobucci, if the pre-contractual representation relied on by the plaintiff is
incorporated into an express contract term, the plaintiff’s claim in tort is
barred independently of the operation of an EAC or NRC—the tort claim
is precluded not in virtue of a contract barrier to action but because of an
exception to the general rule of concurrency of tort and contract.
In Cognos, Iacobucci J., writing in this case for the majority, further
emphasized that the admissibility of a representee’s claim in tort depends
on whether a specific contractual duty is created by an express term of the
contract that is co-extensive with the common law duty of care that the
representee alleges the representor to have breached.22 He also emphasized
that in cases in which concurrency of tort and contract is admitted, the
contract can still play an important role in determining whether or not a
claim for negligent misrepresentation will succeed.23 More specifically,
an express contract term can bar an action in tort by excluding or limiting
either the liability or the duty.24 Clauses that negate the existence of a duty
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

BG Checo, ibid at para 132.
BG Checo, ibid at para 135.
Ibid para 37.
Ibid at para 38.
Ibid at para 132.
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of care are often referred to as “disclaimers” or “non-reliance provisions.”25
In both cases, “the plaintiff may not allege a wider liability in tort in order
to circumvent the terms of the contract.”26 Since, in the case at bar, the
exclusion clauses included in the contract were not sufficiently broad to
limit the defendant’s liability for the breach of duty of care, Iacobucci
concluded that the plaintiff’s action in misrepresentation was not precluded
by the contract.
To summarize, the foregoing discussion has identified the following
important points: An action in tort for negligent misrepresentation is not
precluded by the existence per se of a contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant. However, parties to a contract can nonetheless
limit or exclude liability for negligent misrepresentation through express
contractual provisions. When a specific contractual duty created by an
express term of the contract is co-extensive with the common law duty
of care, the plaintiff is still entitled to claim against the defendant in tort.
In Iacobucci’s important dissenting opinion, in this latter scenario the
plaintiff is barred from exercising a concurrent action in tort and is limited
to the remedies available in contract.
Having examined the general availability, as between the parties to
a contract, of claims in tort that parallel those available in contract, the
discussion will now examine the conditions under which courts may
enforce specific contract terms that limit or exclude actions for negligent
misrepresentations.
2. Conditions favouring enforceability
a. Specifically worded EACs and NRCs
Courts have routinely given effect to EACs or NRCs in situations
involving commercial contracts between sophisticated businesspeople.
A key example of NRCs’ effectiveness is Carman Construction Ltd. v
Canadian Pacific Railway Co.27 Carman Construction Limited (Carman)
was contracted to construct a railway siding for the defendant, Canadian
Pacific Railway Company (CPR), who wished to have a railway siding
widened and sought tenders to carry out rock excavations. The bidding
documents did not disclose the quantity of rock to be removed. Carman
sought information from a CPR employee authorized to provide that
information. Mid-project, Carman learned that the requisite excavations
25. Ibid at para 114.
26. Ibid at para 132.
27. See Carman, supra note 3. See, for comments, Emil J Hayek, “Collateral Contracts and the
Supreme Court of Canada: Carman Construction Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.” (1983) 7:3
Can Community LJ 328
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were substantially more extensive than were first estimated based on the
CPR employee’s representation. When CPR refused Carman’s demand
for an additional payment, Carman sought damages from CPR and sued
both in contract for breach of collateral warranty and in tort for negligent
misrepresentation. The construction contract included the following NRC,
specifically excluding reliance on pre-contractual representations:
It is hereby declared and agreed by the Contractor that this Agreement
has been entered into by him on his own knowledge respecting the nature
and conformation of the ground upon which the work is to be done, the
location, character, quality and quantities of the material to be removed,
the character of the equipment and facilities needed, the general and
local conditions and all other matters which can in any way affect the
work under this Agreement, and the Contractor does not rely upon any
information given or statement made to him in relation to the work by the
Company.28 [Emphasis added.]

The trial judge found that a negligent misrepresentation had been proven
but that the existence of the NRC saved the defendants from liability.
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this finding. The SCC held that
the respondent was not liable for negligent misrepresentation, as the
contractual disclaimer clause limited the duty of care owed by the CPR
to Carman.
b. Generically worded EACs
The SCC case law does not address the issue of whether a generically
worded EAC, which does not expressly exclude liability for negligent
misrepresentation, may preclude a claim in tort. Lacking clear guidance by
the SCC, lower courts have assessed the enforceability of contract barriers
to tort action by considering the degree of specificity of the contract
language together with other factors, such as 1) the level of sophistication
of the parties, 2) the inequality of bargaining power between the parties,
and 3) whether the EAC or NRC has been brought to the attention of the
party sought to be bound.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in No. 2002 Taurus Ventures
Ltd. v Intrawest Corp. provides the most clear and articulate application
of these principles to a generically worded EAC.29 Intrawest operated a
ski resort and planned new ski runs in an area that it planned to develop,
which was located outside the current ski area’s boundary. Its marketing
materials described the area as a ski-in, ski-out hideaway and indicated

28.
29.

Carman, ibid at 961.
See Taurus BCCA, supra note 1.
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that it would have access to lots from three proposed ski runs. The contract
made no express provision as to who would build the ski runs and trails
or when they would be built. Taurus agreed to purchase a vacant lot. The
contract included an EAC, which stated:
This Contract is the entire agreement between the parties and there are
no other terms, conditions, representations, warranties or collateral
agreements, express or implied, whether made by the Vendor, any agent,
employee or representative of the Vendor or any other person. […]30

At the time of the hearing, the ski runs still had not been completed.
Taurus sued for breach of collateral contract, rescission of the contract, and
damages for misrepresentation by Intrawest. It alleged that the purchase of
the building lot had been induced by Intrawest’s assurance that ski access
to the lot would be built by vendors. At trial, the central issue was whether
pre-contractual representations could give rise to damages and whether the
EAC was enforceable to preclude liability for negligent misrepresentation.
The trial judge relied on Iacobucci’s minority position in Cognos in
support of his conclusion that Taurus was not precluded from bringing
an action for negligent misrepresentation despite having entered into a
contract. He concluded that because no express provision was made in
the contract of sale dealing with ski access to the lot, Taurus was entitled
to maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation. He also found
that “a limitation written into a contract does not, in the absence of
express language, exclude representations made during pre-contractual
negotiations.”31
The BC Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision and
found that negligence need not be expressly referred to in an exclusion
clause to exclude an action in negligence.32 The appellate court relied
on Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd.,33
in which the SCC held that the exclusion clauses in the contract, none
of which referred expressly to negligence, nonetheless excluded liability
for negligent failure to warn. The court also emphasized that both parties
were sophisticated commercial entities.34 The purchaser had extensive
experience in real estate development and had dealt extensively with the
vendor in the past. Therefore, the contract was not a “standard adhesion
contract.” The contract contained a detailed description of the lot and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Ibid at para 22.
Intrawest Corp. v No. 2002 Taurus Ventures Ltd., [2006] B.C.J. No. 365 [Taurus BCJ] at para 83.
Taurus BCCA, supra note 1 at para 59.
Bow Valley, supra note 1.
Ibid at para 59.
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the responsibilities and obligations of the various parties involved in the
development. Moreover, the purchaser had several opportunities to address
any concerns they may have had about the details of the development.
In these circumstances, the contract was clearly intended to govern the
relationship between the parties, and it would not accord with commercial
reality to give no effect to the EAC in determining whether Taurus could
claim a tort remedy. The court concluded that the EAC excluded the plaintiff
from claiming in tort for negligent misrepresentation. This decision has
become the precedential basis for several subsequent decisions enforcing
EACs to exclude negligent misrepresentations.35
The same favorable approach toward the enforcement of EACs has
been followed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Houle v Knelsen Sand
and Gravel Ltd.36 Charles and Ernie Houle (Houles) discovered a parcel of
land that they believed to contain valuable deposits of gravel. They pursued
development of the gravel deposits with a company that had obtained an
exploration permit for the property and that engaged Silvatech Resource
Solutions to assess the deposit. They contacted Knelsen Sand and Gravel
Ltd. about the gravel deposit and provided them with the Silvatech data.
A formal contract was prepared by counsel and signed by the parties for
the price of $800,000 payable by a deposit, followed by an initial payment
and then a final payment the following year. The contract included the
following EAC:
The Purchaser acknowledges that he has inspected the property and that
he is purchasing the property as is and that there is no representation,
warranty, collateral agreement or condition affecting the property or this
offer other than as expressed herein in writing.37

When Knelsen began excavations, it quickly became apparent that the
lands contained far less gravel than estimated. Knelsen failed to make the
final contract payment, and the Houles sued. Knelsen counterclaimed in
tort for misrepresentation, alleging that the Silvatech data constituted a
misrepresentation on which it had relied to its detriment.
The Court of Appeal found that the EAC precluded liability for
misrepresentations made during negotiations. The court noted that “in this
case the EAC was inserted after an express request by the Houles, and in
direct response to the negotiations about the sale of the rights to extract the

35. E.g., 0715257 B.C. Ltd v Longiaru, [2008] BCJ No 1808; Cordova Housing Holdings Inc v
Wheeldon, [2015] BCJ No 2709.
36. Knelsen ABCA, supra note 1.
37. Ibid at para 4.
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gravel.”38 Thus, the EAC was a means of allocating the risk concerning the
actual quantity of gravel, which was well known to the parties.39
In Ontario, lower courts have adopted a similar approach by
implementing EACs in commercial contracts between sophisticated
parties.40 A significant recent example is provided by the decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Manorgate Estates Inc. v Kirkor Architects
& Planners.41 The plaintiff, a real estate developer, had enlisted the
defendant to provide architectural consulting services for a construction
project. The plaintiff alleged that prior to entering into the consulting
agreement, the defendant falsely represented the costs of the construction
project and that they had entered into the construction project in reliance
on the alleged negligent misrepresentation. The agreements contained
an EAC that explicitly excluded claims based on any pre-contractual
representations. The court upheld the lower judge’s decision that the
EAC operated as a complete defence to the appellants’ claim of alleged
negligent misrepresentation.42 In arriving at this conclusion, both
decisions considered the two parties’ levels of industry experience. Finally,
contracting parties can increase the likelihood that the judge will enforce
an EAC by explicitly stating in the contract that the agreement has been
fully negotiated between sophisticated parties.43 Analysis of the case law
shows that Canadian courts are generally willing to enforce EACs and
NRCs to preclude claims for negligent misrepresentation in contracts that
have been fully negotiated between sophisticated parties and that have
been professionally drafted and when the EAC specifically excludes precontractual statements.
II. Defeating EACs and NRCs
Two strategies are frequently employed to defeat EACs. The first relies on
the qualification of EACs as exclusion clauses to be narrowly construed
against the party seeking to invoke them. The second relies on the relatively
more recent doctrine of unconscionable terms. Both strategies have been
successfully employed to defeat EACs in adhesion contracts, particularly
in the context of transactions conducted on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid at para 23.
40. Hammer v. Cleeves, 2015 ONSC 2547.
41. Manorgate Estates Inc v Kirkor Architects & Planners, [2018] O.J. No. 3596 [Manorgate
ONCA]. See, also, Haliburton Forest & Wildlife Reserve Ltd v Toromont Industries Ltd, [2016] O.J.
No. 2960 (enforced-Tercon applied and EAC found not unconscionable).
42. Manorgate Estates Inc v Kirkor Architects & Planners, [2017] O.J. No. 6243 [Manorgate
OSCJ].
43. Curtis Chandler v Karl Hollett, 2017 ONSC 2969.
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1. Narrow construction
Canadian courts have often regarded EACs as a special type of exclusion
clause whose purpose is to limit the mutual obligations of contracting
parties to what has been committed to writing and, consequently, to
exclude liability for any statement external to the contract.44 A corollary
of the qualification of EACs as exclusion clauses is that they must be
narrowly constructed against the party seeking to invoke them. Courts
have adopted a strict approach to interpreting EACs in contracts induced
by negligent misrepresentation where an unsophisticated party is involved.
As previously noted, in these circumstances, courts have found generically
worded EACs to be unenforceable unless notice of the clause has been
brought home to the unsophisticated party during the negotiation.
The most coherent and detailed application of this approach is found
in Zippy Print Enterprises Ltd. v Pawliuk, [1994] BCJ No. 2778.45 A
franchisor made pre-contractual statements about estimated gross sales,
expenses, and profits to induce prospective franchisees to enter a licence
agreement for the operation of the franchise. After entering the contract,
the licensee learned that many of the representations were false. The
franchise eventually failed. The license agreement contained the following
two clauses:
It is expressly understood and agreed that the Company has made no
representations, inducements, warranties or promises whether direct,
indirect, or collateral, oral or otherwise, concerning this Agreement, the
matters herein, the business licensed hereunder or concerning any other
matter, which are not embodied herein.
The Licensee acknowledges that he has conducted an independent
investigation of the business licensed…The Company expressly disclaims
the making of and the Licensee acknowledges that he has not received,
any representation, warranty or guarantee, express or implied, as to the
potential volume, profits or success of the business venture contemplated
by this Agreement.46

44. See, e.g., Shelanu Inc v Print Three Franchising Corp (Shelanu), [2003] OJ No 1919 at
para 31-32: the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously held that EACs should be construed using
the construction principles normally applied to exclusionary clauses set out by the SCC in Hunter
Engineering Co v. Syncrude Canada Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 426 [Hunter].
45. Zippy, supra note 2. See also Beer v Townsgate 1 Ltd (1997), 152 DLR (4th) 671 (ONCA),
emphasizing that since the EAC was in fine print, it was not drawn to the attention of these respondents,
the contract was signed in haste, in a frenzied atmosphere, with no opportunity for the unsophisticated
purchasers to read it, there can be no reasonable expectation [the purchasers] were assenting to the
clause.
46. Zippy, ibid para 30 (emphasis added).
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The franchisor sued the franchisee for unpaid royalties and to enforce
a non-competition clause. The franchisee counterclaimed damages for
both breach of collateral agreement and for negligent misrepresentation.
On appeal, the main issue was whether the plaintiff could rely on an
EAC to avoid liability. After characterizing the misrepresentations by
the franchisor as negligent, the court declined to enforce the EAC on the
grounds that an EAC is an “exclusion clause” and that, as such, it must be
narrowly interpreted. The Court stated, “If the clause does not specifically
state that liability for negligence is excluded, then liability for negligence
is not excluded.”47 On this basis, the court ruled in the franchisee’s favour
by awarding damages on the counterclaim.
The rationale underlying the strict approach in Zippy is the Mendelssohn
principle, which holds that when a party is induced to enter into a contract
by a misrepresentation, any clause excluding responsibility for the
misrepresentation is not enforceable.48 The court applied this principle in
the context of a contract of adhesion and emphasized the importance of the
clause being specifically drawn to the representee’s attention. In a widely
cited passage from the decision, Lambert stated:
A general exclusion clause will not override a specific representation
on a point of substance which was intended to induce the making of the
agreement unless the intended effect of the exclusion clause can be shown
to have been brought home to the party to whom the representation was
made by being specifically drawn to the attention of that party, or by
being specifically acknowledged by that party, or in some other way.49

In light of Zippy, parties that intend to exclude claims in tort for negligent
misrepresentation should indicate specifically which prior statements are
superseded by the written document and bring the EAC specifically to
the attention of the counterparty. Zippy has become the precedential basis
of several subsequent decisions in which EACs have been disregarded
by courts to permit claims for negligent misrepresentations based on precontractual statements.50
The British Columbia Court of Appeal has recently confirmed this
approach in Feldstein v 364 Northern Development Corp.51 Mr. Feldstein
had been offered a position as a software engineer by 364. Prior to accepting
the offer of employment, Feldstein disclosed that he had cystic fibrosis and
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Ibid at 34.
Mendelssohn v Normand Ltd, [1970] 1 QB 177 (CA).
Ibid at para 45.
See, e.g., Taggart v No 236 Seabright Holdings Ltd, [2008] BCJ No 2004.
Feldstein BCCA, supra note 2.
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inquired about the eligibility requirements for long-term disability (LTD)
coverage under the company’s benefits plan. The Chief Information Officer
of 364 advised Feldstein that he would qualify for LTD upon proof of
good health after three months of continuous employment. He understood
this to mean that his pre-existing cystic fibrosis would not prevent him
from receiving coverage in the likely event that he would need it if he
worked for 364 for three months without illness. The employment contract
included the following EAC:
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and
supersedes all prior communications, representations, understandings
and agreements whether verbal or written between the parties with respect
to the subject-matter hereof. No amendment, variation, representations
or communications shall affect this Agreement or the Employee’s
employment with the Company unless it is made in writing, signed by
the parties hereto, and states expressly that it is intended to modify this
Agreement.52

After working for 364 for one year, when Feldstein applied for LTD, he
was advised that he did not qualify for full benefits. Feldstein sued 364 for
negligent misrepresentation.
364 argued that the EAC in the employment contract meant that
Feldstein could not sue for negligent misrepresentation. The trial judge
rejected this argument based on two arguments. First, Power J. applied the
rule invoked by Iacobucci in Cognos.53 She found no specific contractual
duty that was co-extensive with the common law duty of care: the subject
matter of the impugned statement (how “proof of good health” was related
to the eligibility requirements for full LTD coverage) did not become
an express term of the contract (the contract merely confirmed that Mr.
Feldstein would be entitled to participate in any benefits plan that was
available to employees). Second, the court applied the principle set out
in Zippy.54 Power J. noted that the contract included no express term
that expressly excluded liability for negligence and which would prevail
over the explicit, specific pre-contractual representation made by 364’s
Chief Information Officer. Therefore, the contract does not preclude the
plaintiff’s right to pursue his claim in tort. The trial judge concluded that
364 was liable for negligent misrepresentation and awarded Feldstein
damages for loss of benefits.

52.
53.
54.

Ibid at para 18.
Feldstein v 364 Northern Development Corp, 2016 BCSC 108 at para 110.
Ibid at para 111.
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On appeal, 364 relied on Taurus to argue that negligence need not
be expressly referred to in an EAC to exclude an action in negligence.55
Further, Mr. Feldstein was not an unsophisticated party: he had negotiated
beneficial terms and obtained legal advice prior to signing the contract.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected this ground of appeal
based on two arguments. First, the court relied on Bow Valley, stating that
exclusion clauses should generally be strictly construed against the party
seeking to invoke them. Second, the court distinguished Taurus, in which
the parties to a contract were commercially sophisticated actors and it was
therefore appropriate to give broader effect to an exclusion clause. In the
case at hand, although Mr. Feldstein obtained legal advice, he was not a
commercially sophisticated actor.56 Therefore, unlike in Taurus, the EAC
could not be broadly construed to exclude liability for the pre-contractual
misrepresentation.
Both Zippy and Feldstein show that the line of reasoning in Taurus can
be reversed in contracts in which one of the parties is unsophisticated or
has less bargaining power. Under these circumstances, the more specific
pre-contractual statement is deemed by courts to prevail over a generically
worded EAC. The prevailing force of the more specific pre-contractual
representation can be grounded conceptually either on the narrow
construction principle stated in Bow Valley or on the co-extensivity rule
invoked by Iacobucci in Cognos.
2. Unconscionability
A second corollary of the qualification of EACs as exclusion clauses is
the application of the SCC’s construction approach, as stated in Tercon
Contractors Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation and Highways).57
In Tercon, the SCC developed a three-part test to determine when an
exclusionary clause is enforceable. First, the court must determine
whether, as a matter of interpretation, the exclusion clause applies to the
case. Second, if the exclusion clause applies, the judge must determine
whether the exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time the contract
was made, as might arise from situations wherein the bargaining power
between the parties is unequal. Third, if the exclusion clause is held to be
valid and applicable, the Court may nevertheless refuse to enforce the valid
exclusion clause owing to the existence of an overriding public policy.
In several cases, courts have struck down an EAC based on the
second component of the Tercon test. An example of this is the decision
55.
56.
57.

Feldstein BCCA, supra note 2 at para 54.
Ibid at para 60.
Supra note 11.
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of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Singh v Trump.58 The case
involved a dispute between two individuals, Mr. Singh and Mrs. Lee, who
purchased units in the Toronto Trump International Hotel. Both individuals
were unsophisticated investors. They were enticed into purchasing units
by alleged misrepresentations made by marketing material projecting
impressive profit margins that never materialized. Mr. Singh and Mrs.
Lee sued for rescission and damages, claiming that they had been misled
by marketing materials. The agreement for purchase and sale and other
contractual documents contained various EACs that could limit the ability
to sue unless they were found to be invalid or unenforceable. The motion
judge held that the plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim was
defeated by the EACs of the purchase agreement and related contracts.59
In assessing the enforceability of the EACs, he relied on the Tercon test
and concluded that it was not unconscionable to enforce such provisions.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in
enforcing the EACs to bar the plaintiffs’ actions.60 In light of the context in
which the clauses were entered into, it would be unconscionable to enforce
those clauses.61 In applying the second component of the Tercon test
(unconscionability), the court relied on the SCC’s proposition in ABB Inc.
v Domtar Inc., according to which an exculpatory clause is unconscionable
“where one party to the contract has abused its negotiating power to undue
advantage of the other.”62 The court also relied on the Zippy principle,
according to which a general exclusion clause cannot override a specific
representation on a point of substance unless it has been drawn to the
attention of that party to whom the representation was made.63 The court
found that the EAC functioned “as a trap to these unsurprisingly unwary
purchasers.”64 The court emphasized that given the plaintiffs’ “minimal
investing experience”65 and that the EAC “was well hidden within the
agreement,” such a clause “would mean nothing” to the plaintiffs.66 They
“could not have reasonably been expected to have understood that this
[clause] meant that the [sellers] were exempting themselves from any
58. 2016 ONCA 747 [Trump ONCA], leave to appeal refused Trump v Singh, [2016] SCCA No 548.
See also 2190322 Ontario Ltd v Ajilon Consulting, a division of Ajilon Canada Inc, [2014] OJ No.
536.
59. Singh v Trump, [2015] OJ No 3660 at para 235.
60. Trump ONCA, supra note 59 at para 94.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid at para 114 (quoting ABB Inc v Domtar Inc 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 SCR 461, at para 82).
63. Ibid at para 115 (quoting Zippy at para 45).
64. Ibid at para 116.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid at para 118.
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liability flowing from their misrepresentations that induced [them] to
sign the contract in the first place.”67 The EAC contained in one of the
contractual documents was “on even more unstable ground [as] it was not
provided to either the [plaintiffs] until after they had signed the agreements
of purchase and sale.”68 The court set aside the motions judge’s decision
and ordered the agreement of purchase and sale to be rescinded for one
plaintiff and awarded damages for negligent misrepresentation to the other.
In situations involving relatively sophisticated parties who have been
given the opportunity to fully consider the agreements at issue, courts
are more likely to give effect to EACs and find no unconscionability. An
example of an unsuccessful attempt by the plaintiff to defeat an EAC on
the grounds of unconscionability is provided by the previously mentioned
decisions in Manorgate Estates Inc. v Kirkor Architects & Planners,
in which the Ontario Court of Appeal69 upheld the motion judge’s
decision70 that the EAC in the relevant agreement regarding architectural
consulting for a construction project operated as a complete defence to
the appellants’ claim of alleged negligent misrepresentation. The motion
judge distinguished Singh v Trump, arguing that the case before her did
not present the same disparities in bargaining power or sophistication
as Singh v Trump did. She found that the plaintiff was an experienced
builder and there was no basis for finding that the defendant abused their
bargaining power to take undue advantage of him. Unlike Singh v Trump,
in the present case, the “differences in experience between the parties are
a matter of degree, and not dramatically divergent, such as a sophisticated
developer taking advantage of inexperienced investors through a complex
marketing scheme.”71 The alleged misrepresentations “can hardly be
characterized as designed to entrap or improperly induce” the plaintiff to
enter into the agreement with the defendant.72 The judge also noted that the
“construction cost is not information that was uniquely in the defendant’s
possession or that it was seeking to hide from the plaintiff.73 She concluded
that the EAC was not unconscionable, and the appellate court confirmed.74
This cursory overview of case law with respect to the unconscionability
of EACs suggests that courts consider EACs in light of the features of

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Ibid.
Ibid at para 119 (emphasis in original).
Manorgate ONCA, supra note 42.
Manorgate OSCJ, supra note 43.
Ibid at para 50.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Supra note 42 at para 18.
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the transactional settings within which the contract has been formed. The
recent decision of the SCC in Uber Technologies Inc. v Heller75 confirms
that the doctrine of unconscionability will continue to play a central role
in courts’ assessments of the enforceability of EACs in standard form
contracts. Although the dispute in Uber focuses on the enforceability
of an arbitration clause in the context of an employment agreement, the
broadly sweeping language of the decision is likely to influence how lower
courts treat all types of boilerplate clauses in standard form contracts
characterized by inequality of bargaining power between individuals.76
III. Assessing the law of EACs and NRCs
This section examines the normative dimensions informing the law of
EACs and NRCs and identifies possible incremental improvements that
courts might adopt. The discussion is organized in three steps. First, I
identify the competing normative concerns underlying the enforceability
of EACs and NRCs. Second, I demonstrate that legal rules governing EACs
and NRCs, while failing to differentiate contracts between sophisticated
parties and contracts of adhesion, fail also to satisfy autonomy and
efficiency concerns underlying contract law. I illustrate this point by
examining two hypothetical legal rules: general unenforceability and
penalty default. Third, I suggest two specific legal changes that Canadian
courts could adopt to improve legal certainty and contractual fairness with
respect to contractual barriers to actions for negligent misrepresentation:
penalty default unenforceability in contract between sophisticated parties
and general unenforceability in adhesion contracts.
1. Two competing normative needs
In determining whether an EAC or an NRC should be given effect to
preclude a claim for negligent misrepresentation, courts must strike a
balance between two competing needs: 1) protecting the representee
from pre-contractual negligent misrepresentations upon which they have
placed reasonable reliance and 2) shielding the representor from having
the representee—dissatisfied ex post for what turned out to be a bad
bargain—“threshing through the underground”77 to find a pre-contractual
remark or a statement that turned out to be false and seeking to rescind the
75. Supra note 15: SCC finding that an arbitration clause within an online standard-form “contractor”
agreement was invalid because it was unconscionable.
76. Ibid at para 89: The SCC states “unconscionability has a meaningful role to play in examining
the conditions behind consent to contracts of adhesion, as it does with any contract. The many ways in
which standard form contracts can impair a party’s ability to protect their interests in the contracting
process and make them more vulnerable, are well-documented.”
77. Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Ltd, [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 at para 7.
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contract on that basis. The desire to protect the representee induced into the
contract through negligent communications calls for courts not upholding
contractual barriers to tort actions to allow the representee to recover
for pre-contractual misstatements through tort actions. By contrast, the
desire to protect the representor requires courts to uphold the principle of
freedom of contract by giving effect to EACs and NRCs, thereby avoiding
the uncertainty of the litigation based on allegations of oral statements at
pre-contractual meetings.
The balancing point between these competing needs varies depending
on several considerations. From an efficiency perspective, enforcing
EACs and NRCs may arguably incentivize the representee (i.e., buyers
and customers) to bear the costs of insuring themselves against the risk
of inadequate pre-contractual information. This argument may hold in
the context of contracts wherein parties have relatively equal bargaining
power, have the chance to individually negotiate the contract terms,
have ready access to legal advice, or have the chance to conduct private
pre-contractual inspections. By contrast, in contracts characterized by
severe power or information asymmetry in favour of the representor,
the enforcement of contractual barriers to recovery for pre-contractual
misstatements may exacerbate the risk of moral hazard on the part of
firms, who may lack proper incentives to clearly inform buyers about
products’ and services’ characteristics. In such a context, the enforcement
of EACs and NRCs may ultimately involve an unwelcome step toward the
philosophy of “caveat emptor.”78
From an autonomy perspective, the argument in support of enforcing
EACs and NRCs may simply be based on freedom of contract: A party
should be bound by such clauses insofar as they have agreed that no
representations at all have been made, or that there has been no reliance
on any such representations in entering into the contract. However, a
distinction should be made between clauses in commercial contracts
wherein parties have deliberately negotiated the allocation of risk and
boilerplate clauses found in contracts of adhesion. Only in the former case
can it be said that EACs or NRCs constitute a genuine manifestation of
freedom of contract, while in the latter case, these clauses are most often a
function of power and information asymmetry between the parties.
The foregoing considerations suggest that, regardless of the normative
assumptions concerning the nature of contract law, any effort invested
toward improving the law concerning EACs must focus on differentiating
78. Cumming, supra note 4 at 1211; Shelby D Green, “Contesting Disclaimer-of-Reliance Clauses
of Efficiency, Free Will, and Conscience: Staving off Caveat Emptor” (2014) 2:1 Texas A&M L Rev 1.
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1) between contracts between sophisticated parties and contracts of
adhesions, and 2) between specifically negotiated EACs and NRCs and
generically worded EACs and NRCs in standard form contracts. From
an efficiency perspective, the relevance of these distinctions lies in the
fact that in contracts between sophisticated parties, the efficient bearer of
risk of harm from defective pre-contractual information is the representee,
while in adhesion contracts, the representor more often bears the risk of
harm. From an autonomy perspective, only in fully negotiated contracts
between sophisticated parties can the representee be said to have given
their full consent, while in contracts of adhesion, the representee’s consent
to contractual barriers to tort actions is significantly more problematic.79
Analysis of the relevant case law has demonstrated that courts already
apply these distinctions. Canadian lower courts consider the specific
language of EACs or NRCs together with the specific characteristics of
the transactional setting within which these clauses operate. The relevant
transactional features include the inequality of bargaining power between
parties, their level of legal sophistication and whether the contract
containing the EAC or NRC is fully negotiated or a contract of adhesion.
Furthermore, these distinctions are explored in the recent evolution of the
SCC’s case law, albeit not with specific respect to the enforcement of EACs
and NRCs. First, in Ledcor,80 the SCC has empowered appellate courts to
exercise a more intense judicial oversight over contracts of adhesion by
establishing a less deferential standard of appellate review for issues of
contractual interpretation in standard form agreements as compared to the
general deferential standard developed in Sattva.81 Second, in Facebook82
the SCC examined several distinctive features of adhesion contracts, such
as inequality of bargaining power83 and lack of opportunity to negotiate,84
to conclude that public policy was sufficiently strong as to deprive the

79. The issue of the quality of consent to boilerplate terms has been the subject of considerable
scholarly debate: see Randy E Barnett, “Consenting to Form Contracts” (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev
627; Benson, supra note 8; Omri Ben-Shahar “Contracts without consent: Exploring a new basis
for contractual liability” (2004) 6:152 U Penn L Rev 1829; Omri Ben-Shahar, “The Myth of the
‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract law” (2009) 5:1 European Review of Contract Law 1; Ian Ayres &
Alan Schwartz “The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law” (2014) 66 Stanford L Rev 545;
Radin, supra note 8 at 82-98.
80. Ledcor, supra note 12.
81. Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, 2014 SCC 53. See, for discussion, Sandra Corbett &
Ryan P Krushelnitzky, “Through the Scratched Looking Glass: Sattva, Ledcor, Teal and Developments
in the Law of Contract” (2017) 1 Ann. Rev. Civ. Lit. 379 at 404.
82. Facebook, supra note 14.
83. Ibid at para 54.
84. Ibid at para 55.
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forum selection clause in Facebook’s terms of service agreement of effect.85
Finally, in Uber,86 the SCC emphasized the “many ways in which standard
form contracts can impair a party’s ability to protect their interests in the
contracting process and make them more vulnerable.”87 In examining
an arbitration clause within an online standard form services agreement,
the Court emphasized that the parties to the contract were unequal with
respect to bargaining power and that the contract in which the arbitration
clause was contained was non-negotiable and on this basis held the clause
to be unconscionable.
The foregoing considerations emphasize a growing tension in the
relevant case law between the desire to preserve the principles of freedom
of contract and primacy of private ordering and the perceived need for
extra-contractual policing of contract formation by courts to protect weaker
parties. It is argued in the remaining discussion that sharper differentiation
between the legal regime for contracts between sophisticated parties and
adhesion contracts could secure marginal improvements to current case
law. To illustrate this point, I examine two hypothetical legal regimes
that solve in opposite, specular ways, the normative dilemma underlying
EACs and NRCs: general unenforceability and penalty default. These
hypothetical rules exemplify the two possible approaches courts could
adopt in assessing EAC and NRC enforceability without differentiating
between contracts between sophisticated parties and contracts of adhesion.
I show that while general unenforceability prioritizes the protection of
the unsophisticated representee, the penalty default rule enhances the
interests of the sophisticated representor. This analysis demonstrates the
impossibility of satisfactorily balancing the normative tension underlying
EACs and NRCs without differentiating the contracts between sophisticated
commercial parties and contracts of adhesion. Considering these issues,
I advocate for courts to differentiate more clearly the legal treatment of
EACs and NRCs in contracts between sophisticated commercial parties
from adhesion contracts.
2. General unenforceability
The discussion will now briefly examine the different impacts of EACs’ and
NRCs’ generalized unenforceability in alternative transactional settings.
Consider a hypothetical legal regime in which—maintaining all other
elements of the current legal regime constant—courts deny the enforcement
of EACs and NRCs. The representee would be allowed to recover for
85.
86.
87.

Ibid at para 38. See, on this point, John Enman-Beech, supra note 8 at 436-443.
Uber, supra note 15.
Ibid at para 89.

Contracting Out Liability for Negligent Pre-Contractual
Misrepresentation

403

pre-contractual negligent misstatements by bringing an action in tort,
regardless of the presence of EACs and NRCs in the written contract. The
generalized unenforceability of contractual barriers to misrepresentation
actions would fail to distinguish between specifically negotiated contracts
between sophisticated parties who have equal bargaining power and
contracts of adhesion. Consequently, the institutional response of contract
law would not be adjusted to the changing balancing point between the
two competing needs to protect the representee’s reasonable reliance and
to shield the representor from fabricated claims.
a. Sophisticated parties
Sophisticated contracting parties may wish to include an EAC or an NRC
clause in a contract for several reasons. A representor—typically the seller—
may wish to include such clauses to protect against the risk of costly legal
defense against fabricated claims of negligent misrepresentation raised
by opportunistic or manipulative buyers. Such clauses may also protect
the corporate seller against the risk of misrepresentation by selling agents
or other corporate representatives, who orally represent the organization
during negotiations.88 In short, contractual barriers to misrepresentation
actions may be regarded as transaction-cost-saving mechanisms that
sophisticated sellers might wish to include in the written contract in
exchange for reducing the sale price.
By accepting such clauses, the sophisticated representee—typically
the buyer—gives up the opportunity to recover pecuniary losses that
are proximately caused by negligent misrepresentations. The buyer
also gives up the possibility to eventually use the claim of negligent
misrepresentation as a post-contractual bargaining chip. However, the
representee may benefit from such clauses, as the seller may reduce the
sale price in exchange for having these clauses included in the written
agreement. Generally, sophisticated representees have the cognitive, legal,
and economic resources (e.g., sophisticated lawyers, accountants, and
consultants) to engage effectively in pre-contractual inspections aimed at
verifying the representor’s pre-contractual statements. They may prefer
to rely on their own ex-ante private assessment of the representor’s precontractual representations instead of paying a higher price for the right
to prove the existence of a negligent misrepresentation in post-contractual
litigation.
These considerations suggest that the enforceability of contractual
barriers to negligent misrepresentation actions may allow sophisticated
88.

Davis, supra note 4.
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parties to create mutually beneficial, value maximizing agreements
by modulating the remedies available at the post-contractual stage and
factoring them into the purchase price of their transactions. By contrast,
a regime of generalized unenforceability would not permit sophisticated
parties to engage in cognizant risk allocation, and it would prevent them
from creating contracts that are mutually beneficial. The representor’s
inability to clearly and decisively contract away the counterparty’s reliance
on statements external to the contract would result in the incorporation
of an insurance premium against the risk of future tort claims into the
transaction price. In turn, the sophisticated representee would face a higher
price for a contractual protection that he or she would prefer not to buy.
In sum, the generalized unenforceability would weaken the sophisticated
representor’s position only to provide unwanted additional protection to
the sophisticated representee.
b. Contracts of adhesion
Contracts of adhesion contain boilerplate clauses that are presented by
the seller and accepted by the inexperienced buyer on a take-it-or-leaveit basis. Under Canadian case law, when assessing EACs and NRCs in
contracts of adhesion, courts apply the Tercon unconscionability analysis.
If evidence indicates that one party to the contract has abused its negotiating
power to take undue advantage of the other, courts will decline to enforce
an EAC. Against this jurisprudential background, a regime of generalized
unenforceability of such clauses would dispense the unsophisticated
representee from the burden proving the elements of the Tercon test. This
would make it easier for the unsophisticated representee to bring actions
in tort for negligent misrepresentation.
Since courts’ invalidation of EACs would prevent sophisticated parties
in fully negotiated contracts from creating value-maximizing contracts, as
noted above, it is unclear whether this regime would constitute an overall
improvement on current case law. It is particularly questionable whether
interference with sophisticated parties’ contractual freedom in fully
negotiated contracts would be justifiable on the sole basis of releasing
the unsophisticated representee from the burden of proving the elements
of the Tercon test. Indeed, under this hypothetical rule, the sophisticated
representor would move from a situation with contractual protection to
a situation with no contractual protection, while the unsophisticated
representee would simply move to stronger protection. In short, a regime
of generalized unenforceability would undermine sophisticated parties’
position to only partially improve the unsophisticated representee’s
protection.
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3. Penalty default
Courts could adopt a default rule stating that EACs and NRCs are invalid
unless the representee freely, deliberately, and specifically accepts them
as a separate provision in the contract. This approach would function as
a penalty default rule—that is, a rule that “penalizes” the sophisticated
representor who fails to specifically contract around the default regime.89
Such a rule would not be too dissimilar from current Canadian case law,
wherein courts are generally reluctant to give effect to EACs and NRCs in
contracts of adhesion, while they are willing to enforce them in contracts
between sophisticated parties that have specifically disclaimed reliance on
pre-contractual representations. It is useful to briefly examine the relative
advantages and disadvantages of such a default regime.
a. Sophisticated parties
A penalty default rule would permit sophisticated parties to attain a better
bargaining equilibrium than that attainable under a regime of generalized
unenforceability. As noted previously, the sophisticated representee
in a commercial context often prefers to rely on their own private precontractual inspections while accepting contractual preclusions to future
misrepresentation claims, rather than paying a higher price for the right to
allege pre-contractual misrepresentations in ex-post litigation. For their
part, the sophisticated representor would likely be willing to reduce the
transaction price in exchange for the enhanced contractual certainty offered
by a properly drafted EAC or NRC. Ultimately, sophisticated parties face
incentives to contract away liability for pre-contractual misrepresentation
while factoring this element into the transaction price.
This solution would involve a major limitation: it is reasonable
to expect that litigation would occur over whether the clause has been
sufficiently negotiated to meet the enforceability threshold. According
to the contextualist approach to contractual interpretation adopted by
Canadian courts, the judge must assess the genuineness of the representee’s
consent by considering all the circumstances surrounding the formation of
the contract. If the representor fails to meet the burden of proving that the
EAC or NRC has been freely, knowingly, and specifically accepted by the
representee, the court will not give effect to the EAC or NRC. In this latter
scenario, the representee is not permitted to claim misrepresentations on
the grounds of pre-contractual misstatements.90. This is a major drawback
89. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of
default rules” (1989) 99:1 Yale LJ 87.
90. This would be consistent with the contextualist approach to interpretation adopted by Canadian
courts.

406 The Dalhousie Law Journal

to the rule, as the value to the parties of an EAC or an NRC is largely a
function of the degree of confidence with which parties can predict what
wording will be adequate to ensure courts’ enforcement of such clauses.
b. Contracts of adhesion
In contracts of adhesion, a penalty default rule would provide only weak
protection to the unsophisticated representee. The reason for this limited
protection lies in the very nature of default rules. Ayres and Gertner have
long demonstrated that the adoption of penalty default rules by courts
may prove to be effective in solving information asymmetries between
contracting parties.91 If appropriately designed, penalty default rules may
provide a contract’s more informed party with strong incentives to share
information with the less informed counterparty, knowing that without it
the contract will not be enforced.
However, the problem underlying the enforceability of EACs and
NRCs in contracts with unsophisticated or inexperienced parties is not
merely one of asymmetry of information; rather, it is one of asymmetry of
bargaining power between parties. In such transactional settings, a default
rule as described above would provide the sophisticated representor
with an incentive to ensure that the weaker, unexperienced representee
provides formal, express consent to the EAC or NRC, thereby affording
only a weak protection to the unsophisticated party in a contract with
unequal bargaining power. Formal acceptance of reliance-disclaimer
provisions would provide no assurance of the representee’s genuine
consent to release reliance on the representor’s pre-contractual statements
and representations. In many situations, the party who is in a weaker
bargaining position may be willing to relinquish protection to conclude
the deal: this could hardly be deemed to constitute genuine consent to
contract terms that may deprive the representee of important legal rights
that they might not even know they have or might not consciously believe
they will ever need to exercise in the future. The idea that the protection of
the weaker party can be grounded on the expression of formal consent to
reliance-disclaimer provisions by the same weaker party within the same
bargaining process is, at best, an uneasy assumption.
4. Preferable solution
The above discussion suggests that neither a regime of general
unenforceability nor the penalty default rule as described would enable
courts to attain an appropriate balance between the buyer’s right to recover
91. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 90 at 106: providing the example of the common law’s refusal to
enforce vague or indefinite contracts.
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from pre-contractual misstatements and the seller’s ability to negotiate
contractual barriers to misrepresentation actions. In this subsection, I
argue that the preferable solution to the normative dilemma underlying
the enforcement of EACs and NRCs is to more clearly differentiate the
legal regime of fully negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties
from that of adhesion contracts. Specifically, the current case law could
be incrementally improved through court application of the following two
rules.
(1) In contracts between sophisticated parties, general EACs and
NRCs should not be given effect to preclude claims in tort for
negligent misrepresentation that are grounded on specific
statements external to the contract that do not contradict or that
are not inconsistent with the express terms of the written contract.
(2) In contracts of adhesion, EACs and NRCs are presumptively
unconscionable and therefore not enforceable to preclude claims
in tort for negligent misrepresentation based on pre-contractual
statements.
a. Penalty default unenforceability in contracts between sophisticated
parties
The proposed rule for contracts between sophisticated parties would
establish that only specific contractual barriers to actions provide a complete
defence against negligent misrepresentation claims. This rule would
essentially generalize the rule identified in Iacobucci’s dissenting opinion
in BG Checo, which conditioned the exclusionary effect of contractual
barriers to negligence actions to the requirement of co-extensivity of tort
duties and contract duties. This legal regime would mark a significant
improvement to current case law. As previously noted, the lack of clear
indications by courts over the degree of specificity required for such
clauses to be enforced is a source of uncertainty around the enforceability
of EACs and NRCs. Against this jurisprudential background, the proposed
rule would clarify that sophisticated parties may attain the exclusionary
effect (with respect to claims in tort for negligence misrepresentation)
only to the extent that an express term of the contract contradicts or is
inconsistent with the pre-contractual statement on which the plaintiff
bases their tort claim. Claims based on pre-contractual statements that do
not contradict or that are not inconsistent with the express terms of the
contract would not be precluded by general EACs and NRCs.
This rule would provide an incentive to the representor to carefully
conduct a forthright negotiation and to incorporate all the relevant
representations in the express contract terms. The more specific and
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detailed the warranties and representations codified in the contract, the
wider the scope of the exclusionary effect will be. The exclusionary effect
would not undermine the representee’s legal protection. This will be a
sophisticated party and therefore arguably capable of bargaining over
specific representations and fully appreciating their implications. One may
object that conditioning the exclusionary effect of an EAC or an NRC to
its degree of specificity would increase the costs of ex-ante specification
of contract terms incurred by parties. However, it is reasonable to assume
that sophisticated parties would be willing to incur this additional cost
exchange of increased contractual certainty. Without certainty, the
transaction costs associated with the arrangement would probably increase
even more drastically.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it is reasonable to assume that
legally sophisticated parties have reached genuine consent on matters
that are the subject of express contract terms. This would justify the
presumption that by including an EAC or NRC in their written contract,
parties have knowingly and willingly given up their right to sue in tort
on matters expressly and specifically regulated by the mutually drafted
contract terms. If a contractual term specifically defines the duty owed by
one party to the other with respect to a subject matter, the latter party to
the contract may not use an action in tort to either impose a wider liability
on the first party than would be available under the contract. Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that this rule would be consistent with the principle
established by the SCC in Central Trust that when a pre-contractual
representation relied on by the plaintiff becomes an express term of the
subsequent contract, the plaintiff cannot bring a concurrent action in tort
for negligent misrepresentation and is restricted to whatever remedies are
available under contract law.
b. General unenforceability in contracts of adhesion
In contracts of adhesion, courts could incrementally improve the case
law by regarding EACs and NRCs as presumptively unconscionable. A
regime of presumptive unconscionability for EACs and NRCs in contracts
of adhesion would enhance both contractual certainty and fairness. As
previously noted, Canadian case law tends to treat EACs and NRCs in
adhesion contracts as exclusionary clauses and assesses their enforceability
based on Tercon unconscionability analysis. However, this legal regime
places the burden of persuading the court of the unconscionability of
EACs and NRCs on the weaker contracting party. This arrangement raises
concerns in terms of fairness, especially considering the difficulties that
inexperienced, unsophisticated buyers encounter with respect to accessing
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contractual adjudication and given the costs and uncertainties associated
with litigation. Furthermore, from the sophisticated seller or representor’s
perspective, this legal regime generates contractual uncertainty, as the seller
is faced with doubt as to what contractual language may succeed in clearly
and definitively disclaiming the representee’s reliance on extra-contractual
statements. In short, the indeterminacy of the unconscionability doctrine
frustrates both the representor’s need for contractual certainty and the goal
of protecting the inexperienced, unsophisticated representee.
The practical effect of this rule would be to release the unsophisticated,
inexperienced representee from the burden of persuading the court that
the elements of a Tercon analysis have been met, allowing them to bring
action against the careless representor in tort. In turn, the sophisticated
representor would be prevented from using contractual barriers to
negligent misrepresentation actions as “traps for the unwary.” That is,
this proposed rule would create valuable deterrence by ensuring that
sophisticated representors appropriately account for losses to others in
deciding how much care to take in communicating the pre-contractual
statements. To enhance contractual certainty, the sophisticated representor
should implement alternative strategies to enhance clarity in their precontractual communications.
Theoretically, a presumption of the unconscionability of EACs
and NRCs would be justified by virtue of the characteristics of the
transactional setting in which these contracts are formed. Information
and bargaining power asymmetry between contracting parties justify a
shift in the normative focus of contract law from the enforcement of the
common intention of the parties to the protection of the disadvantaged
party. Under such circumstances, the policy goal of protecting individuals
who are unable to protect themselves from the unscrupulous actions of the
more sophisticated counterparty is paramount. Reasons that may justify
sophisticated parties allocating contractual risk in a manner that differs
from tort law do not hold in adhesion contracts. While in the former
scenario, the enforcement of contractual barriers to tort actions may be
justified based on the primacy of private ordering, in the latter context,
an express contract term’s exclusion of the duty of care in tort may
likelier result in a wrong without a remedy to the plaintiff’s disadvantage.
Unsophisticated parties may be incapable of protecting their interests at
the negotiation stage. They also may be unable to neither appreciate the
implications of the legal jargon employed in boilerplate contracts or afford
the costs of accessing justice. Therefore, they should not be barred from
submitting allegations of negligent misrepresentation. Both efficiency
and fairness suggest that it is appropriate to place the duty of careful
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and comprehensible pre-contractual communication on the sophisticated
representor and leave open the door to judicial policing of contract
formation through the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation.
One major concern with permitting parties to sue in tort despite the
existence of an EAC or an NRC is that it deprives the representor of a tool
to shield against opportunistic claims by representees who are dissatisfied
ex post with what transpires to be a bad bargain. However, this argument is
unconvincing when applied to adhesion contracts. A legally sophisticated
representor has the economic and cognitive resources to prevent ex post
allegations of negligent misrepresentations by ensuring that all precontractual statements are scrutinized, accurate, comprehensible and
properly justified. The unenforceability of EACs and NRCs would not
deprive the representor of all protection against the risk of opportunistic
tort actions; rather, it would encourage them, as the more knowledgeable,
informed and experienced party, to reveal ex ante more information to
the contracting counterpart. The sophisticated representor is the efficient
bearer of the risk of harm associated with negligent pre-contractual
communications.
Finally, it may be objected that the proposed presumption of the
unconscionability of EACs and NRCs would constitute an unnecessary,
unjustified interference with the representor’s freedom of contract. Under
current Canadian case law, the objection would argue that such clauses
are enforceable only to the extent that they are specifically brought to
the attention of the party to whom the representation was made. This
rule already provides sufficient incentives to induce the representor
to ensure that the representee understands the implications of such
clauses, while concurrently avoiding interference with the representor’s
freedom of contract through presumptive unconscionability. However,
it could be easily counter-objected that, in the context of take-it-orleave-it transactions, the special notice requirement provides only weak
protection to the representee. As previously emphasized, in the context of
power imbalance between contracting parties, the weaker party’s formal
acknowledgment of EACs or NRCs provides no real protection of the
representee’s reasonable reliance on the representor’s utterances.
Conclusion
Underlying the enforcement of EACs and NRCs is an inherent tension
between the representee’s right to recover for negligent pre-contractual
misstatements and the representor’s ability to negotiate contractual barriers
to misrepresentation actions to shield themselves against tort claims in
negligence. Since EACs and NRCs are widely used both in commercial
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contracts between legally sophisticated parties and in contracts of
adhesion in which parties have unequal bargaining power, courts are often
confronted with the challenge that the appropriate balance between these
competing goals varies across different transactional contexts. In a contract
between legally sophisticated parties, the normative focus of contractual
adjudication is to enjoin the parties’ common goals and intentions, which
call for courts to refrain from interfering with the parties’ desire to exclude
representations and liability arising from representations. By contrast,
in contracts of adhesion, the focus is on protecting the vulnerable party
who cannot meaningfully participate in the contract’s design. In this
context, it may often seem more appropriate to give legal effect to specific
representations intended to induce the making of the contract despite the
presence of written exclusion clauses.
Case law analysis has shown that the normative shift from contractual
freedom to the protection of the weaker party is, at least to some extent,
reflected in courts’ decisions assessing the enforceability of contractual
barriers to tort actions. It has been suggested that marginal improvements to
the current case law of EACs or NRCs—in terms of enhanced contractual
certainty and contractual fairness—could be obtained by more sharply
differentiating the legal treatment of such clauses in fully negotiated
contracts between sophisticated parties and contracts of adhesion. In
contracts between sophisticated parties, general EACs and NRCs should
not be given effect to preclude claims in tort for negligent misrepresentation
that are grounded on specific statements external to the contract that do not
contradict or are not inconsistent with the express terms of the written
contract. In contracts of adhesion, EACs and NRCs should be treated as
presumptively unconscionable and therefore not enforceable to preclude
claims in tort for negligent misrepresentation based on pre-contractual
statements.
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